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Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, within an Australian federal system of 
government, have recently passed legislation to improve human rights protection. Both 
enactments are partly based on the United Kingdom’s human rights legislation. This 
article looks at the processes that led to the introduction of legislation in both of these 
jurisdictions. It will also examine some key differences from the United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act 1998 especially around the extent to which ‘public function’ has been defined 
in Victoria. The article will also discuss the reticence of a Conservative federal government 
to protect human rights in Australia and some of its retrograde steps in this regard, and 
the challenges and conflicts that these present for a state-based human rights system.
Introduction and background
There is minimal human rights protection for the citizens and non-citizens who 
are on Australian shores. It is one of the last countries in the western world to 
have little constitutional or legislative human rights protection on a national 
level. Although there is an Australian Constitution, this document largely 
governs the separation of powers between the state, the federal government 
and the judiciary; there is very little in the document that pertains to the 
relationship between the citizen and the state. 
In Australia, United Nations human rights instruments do not become law 
until incorporated into the statutory system within Australia by an Act of 
Parliament. Where however there is some ambiguity in the manner in which 
legislation can be interpreted, there is High Court authority which states 
that international human rights law can be used as a tool of interpretation, 
on the basis that the legislature would not intend to act inconsistently with 
fundamental human rights.1 Some United Nations human rights conventions 
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and covenants have been either fully or partly incorporated into Australian laws: 
these include equal opportunity legislation,2 provisions in the Family Law Act 
1975 (Commonwealth) pertaining to the need to act in ‘the best interests of the 
child’,3 and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.4 
It is in this context that in recent years two jurisdictions in Australia have 
decided to improve the protection of human rights. Both the Australian Capital 
Territory in 2004 and Victoria in 2006 have passed human rights legislation: 
much of this legislation is modelled on the United Kingdom’s Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA UK), with some key differences around implementation and 
the availability of individual remedies and compensation for a litigant. One 
limitation on this state based human rights based protection is that it can only 
apply to areas within state law. This includes areas such as criminal law, prisons, 
freedom of speech, discrimination and some parts of the civil law, but not areas 
such as immigration or social security.
Like the HRA UK, the legislation in these two jurisdictions covers civil and 
political rights only and does not extend to economic and social rights. This is 
the subject of some controversy5 and in Victoria, as a result, a legislative review 
is to occur four years after the legislation comes into force to consider whether 
economic and social rights should be included.6 As in the United Kingdom, this 
absence of economic and social rights does not preclude arguments that pertain 
to such rights being made when they are intrinsically linked to civil and political 
rights being litigated. 
What makes the situation in Australia difficult is that it is a federation: there is 
a federal centralised government in Canberra and six states and two territories, 
each of which have power to control policy and legislation in certain areas 
of policy. As the main recipient of taxation revenue, the federal government 
has been able to maintain control over state spheres of influence by tying the 
receipt of funding to conditions: these are commonly referred to as ‘tied grants’ 
or ‘special purpose grants’. The states’ areas of influence can overlap with 
those of the Commonwealth government, for example, in health, education 
and housing. In addition, various interpretations of the Constitution by the 
High Court in recent years have vested greater powers in the Commonwealth 
government, as it has taken a more centralised view.7 For example, recently the 
High Court awarded the Commonwealth government power over industrial 
issues, stating that the Commonwealth could rely on its ‘corporations power’ 
under the Constitution to make laws in respect of industrial relations.8 Industrial 
relations was traditionally an area in which state governments had retained 
their sphere of influence. 
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Further difficulty arises from a provision contained within the Constitution 
which states that if a state law comes into conflict with the Commonwealth 
law, then the Commonwealth law will prevail.9 This may have problematic 
implications for Victorian and Australian Capital Territory human rights 
instruments. Some of the difficulties of the federal system for human rights will 
be discussed later in this article.
The process which led to human rights protection 
in the Australian Capital Territory 
In discussions between the author and the new Attorney General of Victoria, 
Rob Hulls, in November 1999, Mr Hulls indicated that he was not averse to 
a formal recognition of indigenous Australians in a Victorian constitutional 
document, nor was he dismissive of the idea of Victoria becoming the template 
for other states to introduce human rights protection along the lines of that 
in Canada or the United Kingdom.10 He remarked upon the inertia on human 
rights protection at federal level and said perhaps it was for the states, led by 
Victoria, to take the initiative. In 2000, Mr Hulls commenced a process for the 
development of the justice statement for the state of Victoria, with the idea of 
having a strategic plan and direction for the next ten years of government.11 In 
this document he wanted to include ideas for the development of the human 
rights framework.
In the end, it was the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) which was the first 
jurisdiction in Australia to introduce human rights legislation. Although 
Victoria followed the 2004 ACT legislation with its own Act in 2006, there are 
marked differences between the two Acts which were adopted, even though they 
are both based on the HRA UK. 
The Labor party in the ACT in 2001 had indicated that it intended to establish 
some form of consultative process to discuss whether or not a bill of rights 
should be developed for the territory. The Attorney General of the ACT, John 
Stanhope, had been an acknowledged supporter of human rights for many 
years.  An ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee was convened by the 
newly elected Labor party with a respected law academic from the Australian 
National University, Professor Hilary Charlesworth, being appointed as its chair. 
Other members of the committee were Professor Larissa Behrendt, with expertise 
in law and indigenous studies, Penelope Layland, a journalist and poet, and 
Elizabeth Kelly of the ACT Department of Justice. 
The terms of reference for the committee reflected the political sensitivity of 
the government in the ACT, which feared an electoral backlash that could be 
created by conservative talkback radio hosts and newspaper columnists, who 
were traditionally averse to any discussion of greater human rights protection 
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and argued that any human rights document would detract from the role of the 
Parliament and the elected people’s representative. The consultative committee 
was to examine whether it was ‘appropriate and desirable’ to have legislative 
human rights protection. Further, if such a bill of rights was considered to be 
appropriate then, what form should it take, what would be the effect of such 
a bill on the ‘exercise of executive and judicial powers’, should there be a 
legislative override and what rights and responsibilities should be included in 
such a bill were it enacted.12 A website was established for the committee with 
items such as ‘What are the issues?’, ‘Reports’, and links to other websites with 
information on human rights and other models.13
The consultative committee produced an issues paper. In this paper, information 
about what human rights are and the various models of protection that have 
been adopted around the world were discussed and questions were asked as 
to what models might be appropriate. There was a call for both written and 
oral submissions in response to the paper and the committee also held town 
meetings. In a different route to that taken in Victoria it also held a ‘deliberative 
poll’.14 As a result of the consultations, it was found that a majority of the 
territory’s residents were in favour of a bill of rights. There was however a 
minority who were opposed to any form of a bill of rights. 
The consultative committee recommended a draft bill which was largely 
modelled on the HRA UK. Because of existing resistance to any form of 
entrenched constitutional human rights protection in political circles in the 
ACT, on the grounds that this compromised the sovereignty of Parliament, the 
committee opted for an ordinary piece of legislation rather than a constitutional 
bill of rights. As in the United Kingdom, the committee suggested that judges 
should be able to interpret statutes and the common law in a human rights 
context. The committee also recommended that the judges be empowered to 
issue declarations of incompatibility. It was also proposed that judges be given 
the power to invalidate subordinate legislation that did not comply with human 
rights standards contained in the bill, but not to invalidate legislation. The 
committee suggested that any person be able to bring an action for a declaration 
of incompatibility. It also suggested that a person aggrieved could bring a case 
for a remedy including compensation against the executive if their rights were 
breached. The committee recommended that the new legislation would include 
economic, cultural and social rights within the definition of human rights for 
the new Act. This last measure reflects a growing view in Australia about the 
interconnectedness of economic social and cultural rights and civil and political 
rights.15
As is often the case, the brave and innovative proposals for the form that the 
new bill would take were not all accepted or adopted. Most notably, economic 
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and social rights were not included in the definition of human rights. Remedies 
and actions for compensation by litigants in their own right were also omitted. 
The power to invalidate subordinate legislation was also excluded from the final 
Act.
The provisions of the ACT Human Rights Act and its 
operation
The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (HRA ACT) came into force on 1 July 
2004 and defines human rights in essence as the rights contained within the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Evans has observed that 
in the final Act most references to the executive have been removed, leaving a 
level of uncertainty as to the effect the Act will have on administrative action.16 
In the Australian Capital Territory, in contrast to the UK and Victoria, there is a 
unicameral system of Parliament, namely the Legislative Assembly. Clearly, this 
makes the legislative process much quicker and easier. In the United Kingdom 
and Victoria, however, proposed laws are arguably subject to greater scrutiny 
– for instance because of the presence of minor political parties, which can 
dominate the upper house in Victoria.
In the ACT, under s38 HRA ACT the Standing Committee on Legal Affairs (SCLA) 
is required to report to the Legislative Assembly on human rights issues raised 
by proposed bills. Unfortunately, no additional resources were allocated for the 
SCLA to undertake this task.17 Evans questions whether the committee will be 
able to carry out its obligations effectively. She observes however that in the past 
the SCLA did have an obligation to report on where bills ‘unduly trespass on 
personal rights and liberties…’. These provisions, she observes, are still narrower 
than those required under the Act and so the resource issue remains pertinent.
Like the situation in the United Kingdom, s31 HRA ACT requires the courts, 
when interpreting human rights, to make reference to international law and the 
judgments of foreign and international courts and tribunals where appropriate. 
If lawyers are appropriately trained and start to include human rights in their 
repertoire of legal arguments, then this provision may extend the common law 
precedents to include human rights concerns which have not been routinely 
presented in the Australian courts. Time will tell whether the ‘run of the mill’ 
Australian lawyer will be prepared to rise to this occasion.18 The Act however 
does not require the SCLA to consider delegated legislation.
S33 HRA ACT requires the Attorney General to issue a compatibility statement 
on whether ‘in the Attorney General’s opinion, the bill is consistent with human 
rights’; if it is not consistent with human rights then they must state how it is 
inconsistent. Also, under s33 if the court makes a declaration of incompatibility, 
the Attorney General is required to present copy of that declaration to the 
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Legislative Assembly within six sitting days and to provide a written response 
to the declaration within six months. Evans has raised a concern that in a 
unicameral parliament such as this there is a risk that reports to the Legislative 
Assembly may become a matter of form rather than substance.19 
She also states that the Act does not require the Attorney General to give written 
reasons for his or her view as to the inconsistency or consistency with human 
rights. This situation is different to the legislative regime in Victoria where 
detailed reasons are required to be given by the Attorney General. Evans does 
note, however, that when the Legislative Committee has made an indication 
that a bill is not consistent with human rights, and the Supreme Court later 
affirms their view, then this would be very embarrassing and is an incentive for 
government to avoid introducing bills that are inconsistent with human rights. 
She goes on to argue that this has been the case in other jurisdictions such as 
in New Zealand where the new and formal system of declarations introduced 
by the Human Rights Amendment Act 200120 (NZ) in respect of discrimination 
cases provides evidence that the declarations can have a real influence on 
government policy. Evans observes that although declarations have not been 
all that frequent in the United Kingdom, in a number of cases it has led to 
legislative change that has enhanced rights.21
The more challenging area in all jurisdictions is how the human rights frameworks 
will apply to the actions of the executive and its delegates. This author has a 
particular interest in how human rights frameworks can be used by people who 
are vulnerable, disempowered and marginalised so as to improve their treatment 
and the respect and dignity that is accorded to them. One of the difficulties 
for people who are in this position is that the government and its departments 
often play a significant part in their lives. Poor and disadvantaged people rely 
on government services to a greater degree than the rest of society. They rely on 
governments for income support, public housing, health care, and, given the 
services that are provided to them, are often accordingly subject to significant 
government scrutiny over how they lead their lives and how accountable they 
are. Such a scenario sets up a situation of dependency whereby these people 
are so frightened of challenging their treatment by government agencies and 
so unaware of their rights22 that they tolerate inappropriate intrusion and 
treatment. Often those most likely to litigate using human rights are those who 
are already involved in the legal system and so disposed to using it, for example 
defendants, prisoners and asylum seekers. Whilst they are entitled to do so, for 
many of vulnerable, disempowered and marginalised people even the notion of 
going to a lawyer for help is alien and so effort is needed to include such groups 
in the benefits of human rights protection.23
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In the ACT, as in the United Kingdom, there is a limitation on the scope of 
scrutiny of action by delegates of the executive. In view of the above, this 
is a matter for concern. The Victorian legislation goes further in providing a 
broader definition of ‘public authority’ than exists in the United Kingdom or 
the ACT. This will be discussed later. Clearly, the requirement that the Attorney 
General has to turn his or her mind to whether or not a bill is consistent with 
human rights means that more thought about human rights will be given in 
the preparation of a bill than was previously the case. The ACT government 
is preparing a pre-enactment scrutiny policy and procedures to apply across 
government. Under the legislation a Human Rights Commission was established 
but without a complaints handling mechanism. The legislation underwent a 
twelve-month review recently and this review took submissions. In the final 
report24 various recommendations were made. Recommendation one states that 
‘it is clear that the HRA is achieving results within the Executive and Legislature 
and that it should continue to operate as a dialogue model’. In recommendation 
two it states that ‘while there is a case for improving community engagement, 
the focus at the moment should remain on the dialogue with the Assembly’. 
Recommendation three states that the executive should encourage agencies to 
make greater use of explanatory statements in relation to compatibility and give 
a summary of reasons (recommendation four). 
There was significant discussion on the benefits of the inclusion of economic 
and social rights as well as environmental rights but in the end the committee 
recommended government should explore only direct enforceability in specific 
areas of health, education and housing and not include other economic, social 
or cultural rights (recommendation ten).
Exactly how the scrutiny of policies and procedures will be evaluated and 
measured is an interesting question. A significant cultural change within the 
public service which considers the impact on people’s human rights of their 
actions on the ground is needed if the human rights legislation is to truly have 
an impact. Recently in the Victorian context, the author was informed by a 
very senior public servant that they had little to worry about as their policies 
and procedures were consistent with human rights. This comment revealed 
a uniformed and cursory response to human rights compliance as there are 
policies and procedures which are inconsistent with the civil and political rights 
contained within the new Victorian Charter.25 The comment perhaps highlights 
the immense role of education and training that needs to be undertaken on 
human rights within the civil service, but also reflects a lack of understanding 
of how the policies and procedures operate on the ground and the potential 
scope for challenge that exists. If the government and public servants only take 
a formulaic approach in checking that its policies and procedures are consistent 
with human rights, and if these approaches are not properly scrutinised and 
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assessed for accuracy, then little will change on the ground for citizens.26 The 
difficulty here is that full and proper audits require independent scrutiny, 
proper and appropriate complaints mechanisms and reporting of statistics and 
an empowered citizenry to inform on the impact of policies. Such audits are 
expensive, resource intensive, time consuming and potentially embarrassing 
to the government and the public servants. To have any real effective on the 
human rights framework a detailed examination of human rights compliance as 
experienced by the people on the ground would be needed.
S34 and Schedule 2 HRA ACT include a requirement that all government 
departments and units must include, in their annual reports, statements of 
the ‘measures taken by the administrative unit during that period, to respect, 
protect and promote human rights.’ This is a good provision but again, as Evans 
points out, could also run the risk of being a merely formulaic response rather 
than one which has involved self reflection and consideration.27
The ACT legislation fails to explain in any provision what the human rights 
implications will be where a body is carrying out a public function. This is 
similar to the questions that have been asked in the United Kingdom regarding 
the definition of a ‘public authority’. For example: does it apply to private bodies 
exercising public powers? Will it cover the statutory exercise of a private role? 
These matters will have to be clarified by the courts.
McKinnon,28 in a paper examining the HRA ACT in its second year of operation, 
stated that 18 cases29 had been considered since 1 July 2005, compared to 14 in 
the first year of the Act. She notes that the majority of these cases, 13 out of 18 
were in the Supreme Court. Two were in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
and two were in the Residential Tenancies Tribunal. She indicates that it was 
hard to gauge how many cases have been heard in the magistrate’s courts as 
these decisions were not often recorded. She expresses the view that in the first 
year there was only a superficial deference to the Act and it was not necessarily 
decisive in any of the cases. She notes however that this appears to be changing 
as cases have increasingly included references to comparative and international 
human rights case law.
In the criminal jurisdiction the only reported decision involving the HRA ACT 
concerned the criminal prosecution of a young person for a sexual offence. The 
case was abandoned for want of prosecution.30 The child’s representative argued 
the proceedings should be stayed as there has been an inadequate investigation 
that had prejudiced the child’s ability to defend the charges which was a breach 
of s20(3) HRA ACT. Eckle v Germany31 from the European Court of Human Rights 
was cited. McKinnon observes that this case illustrates that the courts may now 
be prepared to use the inherent powers of the HRA ACT to enforce human 
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rights. There have been several other cases which demonstrate this development 
of the court’s role.32 McKinnon states that ‘while there have been more cases 
under the Human Rights Act in its second year there is still some reticence in 
the legal profession in the ACT to actively apply the Act.’33
In terms of the impact on the legislature, McKinnon argues there are significant 
challenges.34 These include the new counter terrorism regime where the Attorney 
General promisingly sought advice on its compatibility with the HRA. However, 
there have been problems emerging, as discussed above, from the nature of 
state based human rights protection with, for example, the federal government 
overriding ACT laws recognising civil unions between gay and lesbian couples. 
McKinnon notes that other Parliamentary committees have also started to 
use the new human rights regime regarding environmental planning and its 
impact on residential areas and rights to privacy and the protection of family. 
In their deliberations these committees have also used analysis of judgments 
from the United Kingdom courts and the European Court of Human Rights.35 
She raises the concern that the policy of the government has been to require 
that human rights issues are addressed in explanatory statements prepared by 
the department responsible for the legislation. She notes this reflects limited 
resources but states that the current sharing of responsibility for human rights 
across departments does not involve challenging the preconceptions that civil 
servants may have. She laments that the Attorney General’s statements have not 
always given reasons for incompatibility.36
The process which led to human rights protection 
in Victoria
As stated above, the process towards a Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities in Victoria commenced in the late 1990s. Discussions commenced 
when the current Labor government was still in opposition.
Articles appeared in Victorian newspapers37 arguing for human rights protection 
at a state level because it was unlikely, in the political climate, that a federal 
government would initiate such protection. When the government decided 
to launch a justice plan considerable effort was made by non-government 
organisations, individuals and academics to shift the justice statement from being 
a functionary document to one that actually reflected a vision incorporating 
human rights and access to justice. The justice statement in its draft form was a 
document where the main focus appeared to be on the mechanisms of the legal 
system, rather than on the effect of the legal system on the people. 
In the early days of the preparation of the justice statement in 2002-2003, the 
Equal Opportunity Commission was called on for its expertise to provide input 
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into its formulation. Once it was accepted by the civil servants that human 
rights protection should be a pivotal element of any justice statement progress 
was significant. In the author’s view the support of some senior civil servants 
augers well for the future of the human rights frameworks as their involvement 
in the process gave them a sense of ownership and understanding of human 
rights.38 The then director of the Equal Opportunity Commission, Dr Di Sisely, 
and her staff organised round table meetings with a number of individuals and 
members of the Department of Justice who were charged with the preparation 
of the justice statement. These meetings involved providing the civil servants 
with information on why human rights protection was important, how it could 
be implemented and details of other models of human rights protection around 
the world. There was some reticence about the loss of control that departments 
would have if the members of the public were able to challenge them. Initially 
it was suggested that the human rights protections would only be applied to the 
Department of Justice and would not apply across all government departments. 
Forceful arguments were presented to the contrary that the government could 
not pick and choose in this way. It was strongly argued at these meetings that 
human rights protection in the context of a dialogue between the legislature, 
the courts and the executive would lead to improved decision-making, greater 
accountability and could actually be of benefit to civil servants. Once they were 
trained in human rights issues civil servants could prevent potential negative 
impacts of policies on the ground and also avoid critical public scrutiny. The 
argument was that through proper consideration of human rights prior to 
legislation and the introduction of administration policies and processes, there 
would be an advancement of good public sector management.
The difficulty in these early days of discussions was that for many civil servants 
the only exposure that they had to human rights was the United States Bill of 
Rights, which quite justifiably had many critics. Models from elsewhere were 
discussed at these meetings including the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the New Zealand Bill of Rights and the South African constitutional 
protection of human rights under the bill of rights in chapter two of the 
Constitution. The United Kingdom’s legislation was also raised but was still in 
its infancy at the time.
One major concern of both the politicians and the civil servants was the fear that 
the unelected courts could be viewed as telling the government what to do. This 
reservation was a major obstacle in the discussion of human rights and remains 
an issue mainly in the tabloid press and with conservative commentators,39 
even though the actual legislation makes government more accountable to the 
people but still retains the ultimate sovereignty in legislation and policy. An 
increasing awareness of the possibilities for human rights protection in Victoria 
emerged after discussions about the dialogue model that operates in Canada and 
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the United Kingdom, along with a variety of academic articles and evaluations 
of other models in force which were provided to those in charge of drafting 
the justice statement. Many of the key civil servants shifted their position on 
human rights protection from the extremes of cynicism, hesitancy and fear to a 
sense of optimism and preparedness to explore other models. This proved to be 
a time of great opportunity and these key civil servants rose to the occasion.
During 2003, the non-civil servant participants at these meetings started to have 
early morning meetings. It became known as the ‘Breakfast Club’. This group 
eventually expanded to include members of the legal profession, charities and 
churches working with the underprivileged, social service agencies, academics 
and other non-government organisations and statutory bodies. The membership 
at times varied and, as the efforts to improve human rights protection in 
Victoria gained momentum and more meetings and documents needed to be 
drafted, much of the work was done by email. All of the participants volunteered 
their time and their expertise. The expanded group became known as the 
‘Charter Group’ in 2004. The group’s strategies included conducting meetings 
with other human rights organisations; holding workshops on how to write 
submissions; and hosting a website with an online petition.40 Professor Zifcak, 
the chair of the Charter Group stated ’One of the flaws in prior inquiries was 
that there was never enough community interest,’ ’We set out to change that.’41 
A pivotal development was the state government’s commitment in the justice 
statement 2004-2014 to discuss and consult with the Victorian community 
about a charter.
With the Attorney General, Rob Hulls, very keen on the idea of human rights 
protection, the challenge was to convince the rest of his Cabinet, many of 
whom were initially quite conservative and sceptical. In such a political climate 
it was a prudent move by the Attorney General to establish a Human Rights 
Consultative Committee in April 2005 to consult with the community and 
report on how human rights and responsibilities could best be protected and 
promoted in Victoria. Also strategic was the makeup of this committee. It was 
chaired by Professor George Williams, a constitutional law expert from the 
University of New South Wales. The other members of the committee were 
chosen to reflect what the general community might find appealing. They 
included Andrew Gase, an Olympic sportsman, Rhonda Galbally, an admired 
community philanthropist and former founder of the Australian Health 
Institute, and Haddon Storey, a former liberal party member of the Legislative 
Council from 1971-1996. The Solicitor General, Pamela Tate SC, was appointed 
Special Council to the Human Rights Community Consultative Committee.
The government however provided a ‘Statement of Intent’ to guide the 
committee. This sadly was more circumscribed than the model the Attorney 
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General had foreshadowed and indicated the cabinet would not favour 
extension to economic and social rights but rather just civil and political rights. 
In June 2005 the committee released a community discussion paper and called 
for submissions. Booklets and pamphlets were produced to inform people of the 
process and how to engage in it. There were also advertisements placed in the 
daily newspapers. The committee took submissions via the internet, letter and 
postcard and in the end the number of submissions totalled 2,524.42 This was 
the largest number of submissions ever received in Australia canvassing human 
rights issues43 and one of the highest numbers of submissions on any issue in 
Victoria for an independent inquiry. More than 84 per cent of the people who 
made submissions wanted the law changed to better protect their human rights. 
All submissions to the committee were published. 
Despite all of this, the main opponents of the human rights movement 
continued to claim that the process was undemocratic and that it would mean 
the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty.44 However, the preferred model in the 
final recommendations of the committee was a non-entrenched legislative 
model where the court, as in the United Kingdom, could only issue a declaration 
of ‘inconsistent interpretation’ rather than strike legislation down.45 It created 
the dialogue model, as exists in Canada and the United Kingdom, between the 
executive, Parliament and the judiciary. Some Parliamentarians claimed that the 
human rights legislation was ‘contrary to the bible’ and would prevent debate 
on human rights, encourage costly litigation and undermine the separation of 
powers.46 In an odd twist the Leader of the Opposition, in the Parliamentary 
debates, argued that he was in favour of improved human rights protection but 
then voted against the bill47 stating it did not go far enough.
The Attorney General was very aware that human rights protection had 
traditionally been resisted by conservative parties and by talk back radio hosts 
and the tabloid press. He wanted to ensure that the committee consulted 
widely with the public, not just in metropolitan Melbourne but also in the 
rural community.48 He wanted to send the message that human rights belong 
to all people, not just some, and that he wanted their input first into whether 
human rights protection should occur, if so in what form, and what sorts of 
models might be considered if the community wanted further human rights 
protection. 
In May 2006 the Attorney General introduced the Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities Bill 2006 into State Parliament. In July 2006 the Charter 
was enacted and came into effect as law. From 1 January 2007 all new Victorian 
legislation had to be certified as complying with the Charter. On 1 January 2008 
the Charter will take effect across all state government activities. The staggered 
time delay was necessary to enable time for training and processes to be put in 
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place before the legislation comes into full force. This is similar to time delays 
in the UK to ready its instrumentalities for the new Act in 1998. 
The provisions of the Victorian Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 and its 
operation
The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the 
Charter) defines human rights as the civil and political rights set out in Part II 
of the Act. These are close to the rights contained in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights but do not include all of the rights. They include 
equality before the law (s8), the right to life (s9), protection from torture, cruel 
and inhumane punishment (s10), freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
and belief (s14), protection of families and children (s17), cultural rights with 
explicit recognitions of indigenous rights to identity and culture (s19), the rights 
to liberty and security of person (s21), the right to humane treatment when 
deprived of liberty (s22), the rights of children in the criminal process (s23), 
the right to a fair hearing (s24) and rights in criminal proceedings (s25). The 
Preamble sets the tone for the legislations stating:
On behalf of the people of Victoria the Parliament enacts this Charter, 
recognising that all people are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
It also outlines key foundational principles such as the rule of law, human 
dignity, equality and freedom.
S1(2) states the main purpose of the Charter is to protect and promote human 
rights by:
(a) setting out the human rights that Parliament specifically seeks to protect 
and promote; and
(b) ensuring that all statutory provisions, whenever enacted, are interpreted so 
far as is possible in a way that is compatible with human rights; and
(c) imposing an obligation on all public authorities to act in a way that is 
compatible with human rights; and
(d) requiring statements of compatibility with human rights to be prepared 
in respect of all Bills introduced into Parliament and enabling the Scrutiny 
of Acts and Regulations Committee to report on such compatibility; and 
conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to declare that a statutory 
provision cannot be interpreted consistently with a human right and 
requiring the relevant Minister to respond to that declaration. 
S2(3)(a) states that the Charter enables Parliament, in exceptional circumstances, 
to override the application of the Charter to a statutory provision.
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Unlike the situation in the United Kingdom, the initiating legislation gives 
further power to an existing Equal Opportunity Commission, which is renamed 
the Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (the Commission), to 
monitor and promote the human rights culture and its implementation. The 
Charter gives the Commission the power to intervene in proceedings before a 
court or tribunal which relate to the application of the Charter (s40), to report 
annually on the Charter to the Attorney General, to review programmes at the 
request of public authorities and to assist the Attorney General in any review 
of the Charter (s41). This should avoid some of the gaps that have developed 
under the English model due to the absence of a human rights commission 
and will hopefully hold agencies to account and improve practice. The normal 
opportunities exist for other interveners under the Court’s rules.
Again, unlike the situations in the United Kingdom, with the constrained 
definition of ‘public authority’ used by the legislature and limited by the House 
of Lords,49 the Victorian legislature has gone further to extend its definition of 
public authority in Division IV of the Charter. S4 not only defines what a ‘public 
authority is but also gives examples to guide the courts. it states: 
(2) In determining if a function is of a public nature the factors that may be 
taken into account include …
(a) that the function is conferred on the entity by or under a statutory 
provision;  
 Example
 The Transport Act 1983 confers powers of arrest on an authorised officer 
under that Act. 
(b) that the function is connected to or generally identified with 
functions of government; 
 Example
 Under the Corrections Act 1986 a private company may have the function 
of providing correctional services (such as managing a prison), which is a 
function generally identified as being a function of government. 
(c) that the function is of a regulatory nature;
(d) that the entity is publicly funded to perform the function;
(e) that the entity that performs the function is a company (within the 
meaning of the Corporations Act) all of the shares in which are held 
by or on behalf of the State. 
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 Example
 All the shares in the companies responsible for the retail supply of water 
within Melbourne are held by or on behalf of the State.
(3) To avoid doubt:
(a) the factors listed in sub-section (2) are not exhaustive of the factors 
that may be taken into account in determining if a function is of a 
public nature; and
(b) the fact that one or more of the factors set out in sub-section (2) 
are present in relation to a function does not necessarily result in the 
function being of a public nature.
(4) For the purposes of sub-section (1)(c), an entity may be acting on behalf 
of the State or a public authority even if there is no agency relationship 
between the entity and the State or public authority.
(5) For the purposes of sub-section (1)(c), the fact that an entity is publicly 
funded to perform a function does not necessarily mean that it is exercising 
that function on behalf of the State or a public authority.
 
S5 notes that the human rights in the Charter are in addition to other rights and 
freedoms and do not derogate from other rights. Most importantly s7 requires 
that limitations on human rights must be demonstrably justifiable, having 
regard to factors such as the nature, extent and purpose of the limitation. This 
was reinforced in one of the few decisions thus far under the Charter.50
S32 of the Charter states that so far as it is possible to do so consistently with their 
purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible 
with human rights and that international law and the judgments of domestic, 
foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be 
considered in interpreting a statutory provision. The section does not however 
affect the validity of an Act or provision of an Act that is incompatible with a 
human right; or a subordinate instrument that is incompatible with a human 
right and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
Finally, another similarity with the HRA ACT is that a complainant cannot bring 
an action in its own rights on the grounds that an act is unlawful under the 
Charter: it can only arise where other relief or another remedy are being sought 
(s39). Similarly, a person is ‘not entitled to be awarded any damages’ (s39(3)). 
Time will tell how the Charter will impact upon human rights51 but already in 
Victoria an education and training campaign of civil servants, Parliamentarians, 
the judiciary and non-government agencies is under way.52 Such training must 
be ongoing especially in view of the high turnover of staff in some of these 
authorities. 
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There were encouraging signs in Victoria even before the introduction of the 
Charter. The President of the Court of Appeal, in a case requiring the balancing 
of human rights, called on the lawyers making submissions to refer to and 
expound upon international human rights jurisprudence to assist the court in 
the exercise of its discretion.53 The Charter presents a legislative imperative for 
the judiciary to consider human rights beyond ambiguity.
Problems of a federal government that is resistant 
to human rights protection for state and territory 
based human rights frameworks
There have been a number of failed attempts to attain human rights protection 
in Australia. At best, there is national human rights legislation establishing a 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC).54 However, since 
1996 HREOC has lost much of its funding, been strongly criticised by the federal 
government and has been the victim of many failed attempts in the Senate to 
water down its powers.55 In addition, the HREOC has experienced significant 
budget cuts in 1996 and in 2003.56 Fortunately, most of these attempts have 
been blocked in the Senate by the Opposition and some of the minor of parties 
or by the proroguing of Parliament. 
The Conservative Liberal government currently holds the majority of seats in 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, thus making it very difficult since 
2004 to block government legislative reform. A federal election is due on 24 
November 2007.
The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was recently disregarded with the passage 
of legislation in the Australian Parliament with the support of the federal 
Opposition Labor Party. The new provisions remove the right of indigenous 
peoples to social security benefits in certain circumstances in the Northern 
Territory.57 The legislation purported to take action on the lamentable situation 
of child abuse in Aboriginal children. As part of a series of bills passed by 
Parliament indigenous people will now face restrictions on finances (despite the 
fact that many are already destitute), removal of rights of appeal and changes 
to land entitlements, all in the guise of preventing child abuse. For over the 
last decade, the government has tried to remove land rights and minimise the 
control of indigenous communities over their daily lives. This last example 
highlights the precariousness of human rights in Australia – especially for 
its most indigenous people who are vulnerable and marginalised and who 
have been subjected to a long history of infringement of their human rights, 
significantly sub-standard living conditions and lower health and well-being 
indicators (compared to the rest of the population) and paternalistic control by 
governments.
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Conclusion
Poor and disadvantaged people rely on government services to a greater 
degree than the rest of society. They rely on governments for income support, 
public housing, health care, and often are, accordingly, subject to significant 
government scrutiny over how they lead their lives. Such a scenario sets up a 
situation of dependency whereby these people, frightened of challenging their 
treatment by government agencies, in fear of losing their benefits,58 and also 
often unaware of their rights,59 tolerate inappropriate intrusion and sometimes 
poor treatment. For this reason, the extent to which the actions of civil servants 
and their agents are required to conform to human rights standards is a critical 
element if human rights are to be enforced for all. This may be where there is 
most potential for vulnerable and marginalised people to improve their human 
rights given the cost and other barriers which exist in their being able to litigate. 
If departmental agencies in their day to day dealings with people improve 
their policies, processes and decision-making to ensure they are human rights 
compliant, then although largely invisible this may mean a real difference. 
Perhaps policy improvements will needed to be celebrated when they occur. What 
must be bought home to the Australian public, to avoid some of the negative 
reaction there has been to human rights by some in the United Kingdom, is 
the message that human rights belong to all of us and not just selected groups 
who tend to be already before the courts. They should remember what history 
reveals:  once human rights are derogated from we are all diminished and it can 
be a slippery slide downwards if we are all placed at risk. 
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